Who Should Know What and Why? Curated Supply of Political Information

Job Market Paper — Working paper coming soon

Inaccurate political beliefs persist not only because people encounter falsehoods, but because truths that would correct them are selectively withheld. In a pre-registered experiment with 1,200 representative U.S. adults, senders decide whether to share verified immigration statistics with receivers who hold inaccurate beliefs. Senders provide accurate information at high rates (above 80%), but are 7 percentage points more likely to share facts aligned with their political position than facts that contradict it—even when receivers cannot take political action. This selectivity doubles to 13 percentage points when receivers make a consequential political decision, with the amplification operating primarily through withholding of unaligned information. The baseline alignment gap reflects an expressive preference for belief congruence; its doubling under political action reflects instrumental strategy. This curated truth—the selective provision of accurate information—distorts the information environment through a channel that existing fact-checking and anti-misinformation policies cannot reach. #information #experiment #political-economy