Welcome!
I am a PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Cologne and the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
I am affiliated with ECONtribute (Area: Market Design and Behavior) and the Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB).
I will be on the job market in 2026–2027.
Profile
I am a microeconomist studying how institutions shape what people know and do, and how behavioral insights can inform the design of better institutions. My research covers three areas: political information and digital platforms, health care markets, and market design. To test theory and evaluate policy, I combine laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments with professionals such as physicians and journalists, large-scale randomized field experiments, and causal inference with administrative data.
Education
I hold an MSc in Statistics from the London School of Economics, where I received the Royal Statistical Society Prize for Best Graduate, and an MSc and BSc in Economics from the University of Cologne, all with Distinction.
Research
Job Market Paper
Curating Political Information: Who Shares What with Whom?
People share true information slanted toward their positions, which can distort others’ beliefs even without any falsehood. In four experiments, I investigate whether this slant reflects deliberate selection, which motives drive it, and how it affects receivers. Senders intentionally favor facts aligned with their own political positions even with prior knowledge, credibility concerns, exposure, and identity signaling muted. Senders value sharing facts that validate their position, and facts they expect to correct the receiver’s beliefs or to persuade the receiver toward their position. Senders share less with receivers who have different political positions. When receivers’ opinions matter through a real political donation, senders appear to select more on the facts they expect to persuade receivers toward their own position. Professional journalists exhibit similar alignment-based selection even with standard explanations for media bias, such as competition, ownership and audience demand, removed. Senders’ selectivity leaves receivers with less accurate beliefs, and receivers barely notice the selection they face. This selection among true facts distorts information supply at a margin that current policy interventions, such as fact-checking, do not target.
Forthcoming
Soft-Floor Auctions: Harnessing Regret to Improve Efficiency and Revenue (with Bergemann, Breuer, Cramton, Hirsch & Ockenfels), conditionally accepted at American Economic Review.
More Information
Research
Publication in Management Science, manuscript conditionally accepted at AER, and further working papers.
View researchTeaching
Courses in microeconomics and contract theory. WiSo Junior Teaching Award (2022).
View teachingKickboxing
Alongside my academic career, I compete internationally in WAKO kickboxing at the highest level. I am the current World and European Champion, ranked number one in the world, with nine World Cup victories. I serve as the athlete spokesman for German kickboxers and previously served on the executive committee of Athleten Deutschland and the athlete committee of the German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB) (2024–2025).